Interregional disparity is a current issue in Indonesia, but the solution has not touched the ground of the reason. This d-model (or disparity model) is a simple model that offers an alterna tive quantitative device to recognize the emergence of disparity based on a set of causes. The model emphasizes on repercussion between public and private sectors based on regional character istics assumed as natural rich region and industrial region. The results shows that imposing higher tax improves all targets of development measurements, however based on the characteris tics of the model it is suggested that the structural changes is needed especially for the long run.
Introduction
Demands of better treatments from natural resource rich region (R) in Indonesia significantly increase. The R regions claim that Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, excessive ly gains from exploring their resources, while they have not experienced significant develop ments. We are interested to scrutinize it that was during Suharto (the second president of the Republic of Indonesia) era, in which his cabinet is called the New-Order-Era Cabinet.
In this paper we adopt De Santis study to specify oil industry characteristics. In his study it is shown in table 1, De Santis (October 2000, pp-40), that the oil company gains the opportunity cost from consumer relative prices that make them be able to control the input prices. To determine the share of public sector on country economy, we adopt Fukuchi study. We assume contribution of public sector to industrial output in Japan, Fukuchi (May 1996, pp-33) , is the same as that in Indonesia.
We develop a model (d-model) based on the basic idea that R people claim of being exploited; and simulate the model to measure the implementation effect of different financial policies, and political stances particularly to both regions. In the model Indonesia is divided into 2 regions that are Jakarta, as industrial region (I) and East Kalimantan, as natural -resource-rich region (R). The former region (I) has sufficient skilled labors, and the other (R) has large amount of natural resources. There exists a wide gap of per capita income between those regions, and this gap is continually getting wider. The basic pattern of the model is to quantify the policy effects on income distribution emerges under a certain industrialization type that disposable income for industrial region is higher, but not in R region, even though natural resource industry is established.
At first the development of the model is discussed step by step to observe the emergence 
1) Industry terminology should be read modern industry, it does not include traditional industry, such as home, and cottage industry.
We assume linear homogeneity, such that a1+a2+a3=1, therefore the production function for industry in region-1 for three sectors is described as:
The remuneration to each input factors is given in Appendix (18), (19), and (22) Appendix1.
In this case the production and disposable income per capita in region-1 are higher than those in region-2 as we mention in (5), (6), and figure 2:
(5) and (6) Fig 
The surplus can be described further in figure 3: Figure  3 H. DAMAR 
We assume the surplus is distributed parallel to the number of population as: 
To solve the problems, we calculate the surplus from empirical data of Indonesia as mentioned at (20) and (21) in Appendix 1-assuming constant remuneration of the factors.
The existence of the surplus gives a possibility for the region-2 to get higher income than that in region-1, but not in term of disposable income. Even though production income in region-2 is higher, the disposable income actually indicates the opposite case (figure 4, and 5). Region-1 gains at the most from the income brought by residence in region-1 working in region-2, pluses some surpluses distributed that can be expressed in (14) and (15): The number of government employees (civil servants) in region-1 is given as Eml , and in region-2 is Em2. Due to the intention of the government to enhance high growth , the government employees are remunerated at the wages v that is lower than it should be (wH) . d is the parameter of differences between the actual wage received , and that it should be (wH). The expressions are at (39), (40), (42), (43), (45), (46), and (47) to (51) in Appendix 1 .
Simulation Study By d-model
First, the baseline solution is set based on previous policy , and then it is compared with various cases. The diversion from the base line solution is observed to analyze the effect given different kinds of political stances. We set 3 different political stances , and 3 kinds of financial instruments. The Political Stances:
1. Existing Policy (EP) in which the political stances in Suharto era remains the same. The results from the simulation can be described in Appendix 2 , to 4 as interpreted bellows. 3.2 Scenario-2 Interest Tax Effect • Imposing tax on interest causes high growth in both regions; in EP region-1 and region-2 incomes grow by 2.21% and 1.36%; 2.11% and 7.34% in NP, and 1.81% and 13.60% in the R2P. Aggregate income grows by 1.74%, 2.68%, and 3.53% respective ly. The logic is high interest tax affects private sectors to invest in high opportunity profit sectors, and without quota, R-sector is extensively explored.
Region I Industry Income Growth (Tax on Interest Effect) Table 3 , in the EP, surplus distribution effects region-1 by small increase 0.09%, in NP 0.02%, and negative result -0.23% over the baseline solution in R2P. In this policy there are worse investment environment signal, in reverse of no redistribution of income signal.
• This policy influences private sector to be less aggressive , and it negatively affects region-1 in the short run causing excessive decline compared to the baseline solution.
With this policy, we have the least welfare indexes compared to the previous policies 0.07%, 0.87%, and 1.54% in respect to the three political stances. In the EP.
General Results of The Simulations
• Those 3 financial instruments in all of the 3 stances result in the increase of aggregate income growth and welfare improvement.
Both regions receive the benefit, even thought the region-1 extracts the major part of R-sector income from region-2. This aspect offers an opportunity of establishing virtuous cycle, especially through tax mechanism (higher tax rate, or efficiency of tax collection). 
Concluding Remarks
The d-model gives a hint about how the interregional disparity happens. It offers an alternative to simulate different policies to maximize national objectives. Assuming limited sources, it also gives a general sense that the disparity seems to happen in a similar vein, but in a different mechanism.
The simulation results shows that during Suharto era the policy worsened the disparity of income especially in terms of disposable income. More concentration on job creation without concerning quality and productivity only influences additional job creations, however the quality of life relatively remains constant, and the riches who are relatively small number take higher proportion of income. The three financial instruments implemented in the political stances result in desirable outcomes, income increases, and welfare improves. It is an opportunity to establish virtuous cycle, especially by enhancing tax revenue. Such a benefit is probably the positive aspect of a country with dual economy figure (Industrial and Natural Resources).
This model also suggests that higher tax (proportional tax) rate policy gives a better economy improvement for both regions, because of the redistribution income mechanism effect that induces overall welfare, and reduces the disparity of income gap. Two factors that need to be concern are the changes of factor price, and the movement of the capital. The surplus distribution does not gives a signal of significant improvement on the reduction of regional income bias, and even gives negative impact on government budget revenue.
Also the diminishing slope of growth and disparity divergence effect in the long run needs to be considered.
The basic characteristic of the model gives a fact that the disparity might not be significantly reduced without structural changes. This is a hint why direct investment, technology development and financial aids do not automatically maximize the people welfare, and it often enlarges income disparity and social instability.
